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Objections to Taxing Resale of
Residential Property Under a VAT
By Wei Cui
Introduction
In discussions on VAT design conducted in many
countries, improving the VAT treatment of housing
continues to receive attention as an important
policy topic. A recent survey of international prac-
tices shows that countries still adopt very different
approaches to taxing real estate under their VAT
and goods and services tax regimes.1 An earlier
classification developed by the Dutch economist
and lawyer Sijbren Cnossen2 groups these diverse
approaches roughly under the rubrics of the exemp-
tion method and the tax method. Under the exemp-
tion method, commonly applied in Europe, all sales
and long-term leases of residential property are
exempt from the VAT, but the VAT paid by home
builders on input purchases is not creditable and
therefore may be buried in sale or rental prices.
Consumers of housing thus may indirectly bear
some of the VAT burden, and to the extent that
different inputs into housing production are taxed
differently (for example, some are exempt and
others are not), tax-induced distortions in produc-
tion decisions may result.
By contrast, the tax method, which describes the
‘‘modern VAT’’ adopted under the Canadian, Aus-
tralian, and New Zealand GSTs, subjects the first
sales of residential property to the VAT. This is more
likely to result in the full future consumption value
of new housing being included in the consumption
tax base3 and may also reduce distortions in hous-
ing production decisions. In a variation of the tax
method (adopted in the United Kingdom), the sale
of new residential property is zero rated, which
allows all previous VAT paid on input purchases by
producers of housing to be refunded. This removes
distortions in housing production decisions, but at
the cost of giving up taxing housing consumption.
It has increasingly been recognized, however,
that even in countries with the widest consumption
tax bases, the taxation of housing consumption
under the VAT is incomplete.4 This is mainly due to
two factors. First, the relatively young nature of the
VAT for most countries means a significant portion
1Sijbren Cnossen, ‘‘Improving the VAT Treatment of Exempt
Immovable Property in the European Union,’’ in VAT Exemp-
tions: Consequences and Design Alternatives (forthcoming). See also
Robert Brederode, ed., Immovable Property Under VAT: A Com-
parative Global Analysis (2011).
2Cnossen, ‘‘VAT Treatment of Immovable Property,’’ Tax
Notes Int’l, Mar. 20, 1995, p. 1037.
3See below for a further discussion of the method of taxing
housing consumption under the pre-collection method.
4See Satya Poddar, ‘‘Taxation of Housing Under a VAT,’’ 63
Tax L. Rev. 443 (2010); Rebecca Millar, ‘‘VAT and Immoveable
Property: Full Taxation Models and the Treatment of Capital
Gains on Owner-Occupied Residences,’’ in VAT Exemptions,
supra note 1.
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The pre-collection of tax on imputed consump-
tion generated by owner-occupied housing plays a
crucial role in consumption tax theory and real-
world tax regimes. But even under VAT systems
with the widest tax bases, the taxation of imputed
housing consumption is incomplete because preex-
isting housing stock is typically not taxed when the
VAT is introduced, and because housing value may
appreciate after the initial sale. Some have recom-
mended taxing residential resale to capture previ-
ously untaxed consumption value. This article
argues that because the incidence of any properly
designed tax on resale will fall only on economic
rent and existing assets, taxing housing resale in
itself cannot produce efficiency gains. Moreover, to
avoid distortions and be consistent with consump-
tion tax theory, a tax on resale must be refined to
ensure the nontaxation of investment returns other
than economic rent. The refinements are alien to
normal VAT mechanisms and can no longer be
viewed as embodying the pre-collection method.
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of housing stock has not been subject to tax on
initial sale. Second, no country subjects the resale of
residential property to the VAT. This not only means
that previously untaxed residences continue to be
untaxed, but also that the increased consumption
value of housing attributable to unexpected appre-
ciation falls outside the VAT’s reach. Many con-
sumption tax theorists who have identified this
issue view it as a flaw in existing VAT systems.5
Some therefore advocate taxing the resale of resi-
dential property in the context of either the reform
of existing VATs or the implementation of new
VATs.6 Others believe that political resistance would
render more fulsome consumption taxation of
housing unlikely in most countries.7
Subjecting the resale of housing to consumption
taxation seems feasible from an administrative per-
spective. Many countries subject the resale of busi-
ness or residential real estate to transfer taxes,
which suggests that the detection of these transac-
tions is not difficult. Although delineating the tax
base that a consumption tax should target in a
resale transaction requires precision,8 finding real-
world approximations for it may be no more ad-
ministratively or politically difficult than taxing
capital gains from similar properties under an in-
come tax, and capital gains taxation of real estate
transactions is widespread. In many housing mar-
kets, property appreciation may be gradual (or fast
but transient), so targeting previously untaxed
value in residential property is not always promis-
ing from a revenue perspective. On the other hand,
some large and active housing markets in the world
— in Australia, China, and India, for example —
have witnessed extraordinary and sustained appre-
ciation in housing value in recent years. The rev-
enue potential of taxing residential resale in these
markets is great. In light of these strong housing
markets, along with the feeling in some countries
that the wealthy have been the primary beneficia-
ries of real estate booms, one should not underesti-
mate the political feasibility of a new policy.9
However, the question whether the resale of
residential property should be subject to consump-
tion taxation under the VAT/GST is not just a
matter of evaluating the practical feasibility of
something that is unquestionably desirable from a
theoretical perspective. In this article, I suggest that
there are significant conceptual challenges facing
proposals of taxing residential resale. The most
important of these is that the economic incidence of
a tax on resale is likely to fall fully on the seller of
property, while the actual consumers of housing,
per consumer, do not bear the tax. This is because
existing housing stock is by definition inelastically
supplied and because any additional taxable value
found in previously taxed property represents
infra-marginal rent. As a result, a key objective of
consumption tax policy — namely, ensuring that
different consumption goods are taxed at similar
rates and that consumption choices are not dis-
torted by taxation — is not furthered by taxing the
resale of residential property. Moreover, because the
tax on resale may be avoided by deferring resale, it
creates a special type of lock-in effect that results in
tax-induced overconsumption by housing owners.
Equally important, because existing housing has
already been produced, taxing it cannot enhance
production efficiency, which traditionally has been
another VAT objective.10
This critique of proposals to subject housing
resale to the VAT is made on efficiency terms, as
opposed to fairness or legal doctrinal terms, and it
treats housing entirely as a consumable asset. This
article also attempts to further sharpen the debate
between advocates and opponents of applying the
VAT to housing resale by considering whether
housing should be viewed in part as an investment
asset, and what the implications would be.11 Deny-
ing that housing has investment value beyond its
consumption value is implausible. However, admit-
ting the investment value of housing means that
proponents of taxing resale must allow for adjust-
ments for the risk-free rate of return, as well as any
nominal appreciation due to inflation. To avoid
taxing risk taking, as a consumption tax ought to,
the proposal to tax resale must also allow the
possibility for refund in cases of housing devalua-
tion. Not only are these adjustment and refund
mechanisms alien to the VAT regime, but they also
5See Liam Ebrill et al., The Modern VAT, at 98-99 (2002);
Cnossen, supra note 1; and Cnossen, supra note 2.
6Alan Schenk and Oliver Oldman, Value Added Tax: A Com-
parative Approach 429-431 (rev. ed. 2007).
7Poddar, supra note 4.
8See below for a discussion of possible needs to adjust for
time value return, risk, and inflation.
9Taxing the resale of residential properties was reportedly
discussed when Canada enacted its GST legislation. Poddar,
supra note 4, at 459. This taxation is also embodied in the current
Chinese consumption tax treatment of housing, and the ques-
tion whether it should be continued during further VAT reform
is being considered. See Wei Cui, ‘‘Learning to Keep the Con-
sumption Tax Base Broad: Australian and Chinese VAT Design
for the Housing Sector,’’ in The Australian GST: Looking Forward
From the First Decade, at 367-377 (2011).
10Ebrill et al., supra note 5, at 15-7.
11Millar, supra note 4, argues that housing represents a
mixture of consumption and investment assets. Poddar, supra
note 4, assumes that housing is completely a consumption asset.
COMMENTARY / VIEWPOINTS
(Footnote continued in next column.)
778 TAX NOTES, November 12, 2012
deviate from the traditional conception of the use of
the pre-collection method for consumption tax pur-
poses.
Overall, this article suggests that despite im-
provements in VAT design, any transaction-based
tax still cannot succeed in fully taxing imputed
housing consumption. Current taxation of housing
consumption — under an income, consumption, or
a property tax — is required for full taxation.
Pre-Collecting Tax on Imputed Consumption
Buying a house or a condominium is, in some
fundamental ways, just like buying durable con-
sumer goods like refrigerators, cars, and furniture.
The act of the purchase is not itself an act of
consumption. Instead, consumption happens when
the durable good is used. A uniform tax on con-
sumption should tax the value of imputed con-
sumption just as it taxes other forms of
consumption of goods and services. However, for
durable goods, this is usually achieved by collecting
the tax when the durable good is purchased, rather
than as it is used. The purchase price of a consumer
durable good generally reflects its consumption
value during its useful life. Assuming that the
(tax-exclusive) purchase price equals the sum of the
present values of the use of the good during each
future period, a tax imposed on the purchase price
equals the sum of the present values of tax pay-
ments that could be collected from the imputed
consumption of the good during future periods.
Algebraically:
(1) V*T = Σt [T*ct/(1+r)t]
where t = time period; ct = the value of the
consumption use of the good in period t; r = rate of
discount; T = tax rate applicable to all periods; and
V = tax-exclusive purchase price of the durable
good.
Where this equivalence holds, taxing purchases
has the effect of pre-collecting the tax on the im-
puted consumption of the purchased goods. This is
how countries with VATs generally tax the con-
sumption of durable goods other than housing,12
and its superiority from an administrative perspec-
tive is easily appreciated. Extending the pre-
collection method to imputed housing consumption
implies taxing initial purchases of housing, which is
what Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and a num-
ber of other countries currently do under the mod-
ern VAT.13 By contrast, under the traditional
European VAT, sales of residential property are
often exempt from the VAT14 and subject only to
turnover taxes that are not part of a comprehensive
consumption tax.15 In standard discussions of VAT
design, the modern VAT is considered superior,
because exempting the sales of residential proper-
ties means that the material and labor inputs to
housing construction are still subject to the VAT,
which encourages builders to self-supply to avoid
the VAT in the production process and results in
other distortions in production choice. Moreover,
taxing only the input to housing production under-
taxes the consumption value of housing to the
extent that the sales price of housing exceeds tax-
able factor costs.16
However, this latter flaw — of undertaxing hous-
ing consumption value — may also afflict VAT
systems that tax only sales of new residential prop-
erty, to the extent that equation (1) above does not
hold. For housing, the most important assumption
underlying the equivalence expressed in equation
(1) that may be violated is that the purchase price
fully reflects future consumption value. In some
historical periods and in some locations, housing
values may witness unexpected appreciation or
depreciation that had not been fully anticipated or
capitalized into purchase prices. Although these
changes may occur for various reasons, an impor-
tant reason is enhanced locational premium. Urban-
ization, the building of new transportation
pathways and amenities, unexpected rises in in-
come in the local population, and so forth may all
enhance the value of real property in ways that
could not easily be predicted. Unexpected apprecia-
tion normally does not happen to other durable
consumer goods, although it may happen to art-
work, collectibles, and the like. When it does hap-
pen, the pre-collection method undertaxes imputed
consumption.
Also, even when equation (1) does hold, taxing
imputed housing consumption only through the
sale of new housing may result in undertaxation —
that is, if residential properties are subject to the
VAT only on their initial sale, the housing stock
existing when the VAT is introduced will never bear
the VAT. Although this is true of other consumer
durables as well, it may be neglected for goods that
have limited useful lives and tend not to be resold
12Ebrill et al., supra note 5, at 98.
13Id.; Poddar, supra note 4; Cnossen, supra note 2.
14Under the European VAT directive, member countries may
allow the seller the option to treat a sale as taxable. But this is
relevant mostly only when the buyer is a VAT-paying business
that can use the input credit. Cnossen, supra note 1.
15To equalize the treatment of owner-occupied and rental
housing, long-term rental of residential property is also typi-
cally exempt from the VAT (sometimes with the option to elect
taxable treatment). Cnossen, supra note 2.
16Poddar, supra note 4.
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for substantial values. Because residential proper-
ties have long useful lives and their resale repre-
sents a substantial part of the housing market, these
properties are different.
Perpetual nontaxation (under the VAT) of hous-
ing that existed before the introduction of the VAT
may be viewed as troublesome for two distinct
reasons. First, if the owners of these properties
continue to occupy them, their housing consump-
tion may be undertaxed relative to other consump-
tion options. At least in some circumstances, the
effectively nonuniform taxation that results may
distort the consumption choices of the owner occu-
piers.17 As we will discuss in the next section, the
problem is that taxing resale may actually worsen,
not alleviate, these distortions. A second and quite
different concern is illustrated by the case in which
the owner sells the housing property after the
introduction of the VAT. Someone might suggest
that if (i) preexisting housing is resold in the same
market as newly produced housing; (ii) property
prices are determined by newly produced housing;
and (iii) the latter is subject to the VAT while the
former is not, then the seller of existing housing
reaps a windfall gain.18
Consider a concrete example in which an apart-
ment owned and occupied by person A had a
market price of $100,000 before the introduction of
the VAT. The introduction of the VAT would cause
prices to rise. If the VAT is imposed at 15 percent,
comparable new apartments would sell at $115,000
after the VAT’s introduction, with $15,000 being
paid to the government, leaving $100,000 after-tax
net proceeds to the sellers. If A’s apartment is sold
at $115,000, but no tax is paid to the government
because resale is not subject to the VAT, then A
pockets $115,000 in net proceeds. This raises a
concern about the unintended distributional conse-
quences of introducing the VAT. Note that the
concern is not with distorted relative prices for
consumption goods, because new and existing
housing is assumed to be priced the same for
buyers as consumers.
The validity of this second concern is open to
dispute.19 It may be argued that if, after the intro-
duction of the VAT, the prices of all goods rise by 15
percent, just as the example assumes the prices of
apartments do,20 A’s purchasing power from the
sale of the apartment is the same as it would have
been without the introduction of the VAT. Even
with $115,000 of proceeds, A is able to purchase no
more than the amount of other goods that he would
have been able to purchase with $100,000 before the
introduction of the VAT. The same argument could
be made if the prices of goods rise by less than the
full rate of the VAT: Whatever the extent of the
general price adjustment, A’s windfall from not
being taxed on his resale of the existing apartment
is offset by the reduction in his purchasing power
due to the general price increase. Although with a
VAT in place, A might be better off than sellers of
newly produced housing, A is not better off than if
the VAT hadn’t been imposed.
To better understand these opposing views, the
distributional consequences of leaving existing
owner-occupied housing out of the VAT base when
the VAT is introduced must be assessed in light of a
more general framework for analyzing transitional
issues. This type of framework has been developed
and refined by various economists.21 In summary:
An important type of transition effect associated
with the introduction of the VAT (and VAT rate
adjustments generally)22 is the so-called capital levy
17More specifically, if the owner of this housing can sell it at
the same price as the VAT-inclusive price of comparable new
housing, but the resale of the used property is not subject to the
VAT, the owner of used housing should be able to sell the used
housing property and use the proceeds on consumption choices
of equal consumption value as the property sold, even if those
new consumption choices are subject to the VAT. In this
situation, the nontaxation of used housing is not distortionary.
However, if the used housing cannot be sold at the VAT-
inclusive price of new housing, the nontaxation of used housing
may be distortive. See infra text accompanying footnote 41.
18Poddar, supra note 4, at 458.
19I am grateful to Peter Merrill for raising this point. See also
Ebrill et al., supra note 5, at 99.
20Reasons for expecting a general price increase include the
fact that it would be difficult for nominal wages to go down and
that non-adjustment would drive many businesses into bank-
ruptcy. See David Bradford, ‘‘Consumption Taxes: Some Funda-
mental Transition Issues,’’ in Frontiers of Tax Reform, at 135-136
(1996). Price increases have indeed been observed in connection
with the introduction of new VATs in countries like Australia
and New Zealand.
21See especially Bradford, id.; Shounak Sarkar and George R.
Zodrow, ‘‘Transitional Issues in Moving to a Direct Consump-
tion Tax,’’ 46 Nat’l Tax J. 359 (1993); Louis Kaplow, ‘‘Recovery of
Pre-Enactment Basis Under a Consumption Tax: The USA Tax
System,’’ Tax Notes, Aug. 28, 1995, p. 1109; Louis Kaplow,
‘‘Capital Levies and Transition to a Consumption Tax,’’ in
Institutional Foundations of Public Finance: Economic and Legal
Perspectives (2009).
22Because in the United States the introduction of a VAT has
often been discussed in connection with the repeal of the income
tax, transitional effects of the introduction of a VAT should be
separated into two sets of effects — those due to the VAT’s
introduction and those due to an income tax’s repeal. The first
set of effects also arise whenever the tax rate of an existing VAT
goes up (and down), because the introduction of a VAT is
equivalent to increasing the general VAT rate from zero to some
positive rate. For the same reason, the second set of effects also
arises whenever the tax rate of an existing income tax goes
down (and up). When the enactment of a VAT or change in VAT
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on existing business assets.23 The idea of the capital
levy is that if a business asset is consumed (or
converted into cash or assets that are then con-
sumed) before the enactment of the VAT (rate
increase), it would benefit its owner more than if the
asset is used (or sold) for consumption after enact-
ment. Compared with pre-enactment consumption,
an asset kept for consumption until post-enactment
loses consumption value because of government’s
extraction of tax through the VAT.24
Unlike preexisting business assets, housing and
other durable consumer goods held by owner-users
are not subject to the capital levy, precisely because
their consumption is generally not currently taxed
under the VAT.25 Indeed, as Louis Kaplow puts it:
‘‘If consumer durables were treated using a prepay-
ment approach, under which purchases would not
be deductible as investment and sales proceeds
would be exempt, there may be a substantial incen-
tive for individuals to purchase consumer durables
before enactment’’ of the VAT.26 Preexisting owner-
occupied housing sold tax free after the enactment
of a VAT enjoys the same treatment. The nontaxa-
tion of these sales exempts the existing housings
assets from the capital levy. That, however, does not
mean the assets enjoy a windfall, relative to the
state where there is no VAT.27
Nonetheless, taxing the resale of existing housing
might be unfair if we think about existing resi-
dences that have been taxed but have experienced
unexpected appreciation. Although the concern
about a windfall is raised in connection with hous-
ing acquired before the enactment of the VAT, that
concern should also apply to the resale of previ-
ously taxed housing. Such residences may also sell
in the same market as newly constructed properties,
and thus may benefit from an increase in prices
attributable to the VAT, without actually paying the
tax. It should be clear that such sellers receive an
unjustified benefit.
Regardless of how compelling one finds the
distributional concern about not taxing re-sales of
residences, clearly the nontaxation of unexpected
appreciation and pre-VAT housing stock leaves
consumed value outside the consumption tax base.
Recent proposals to tax the resale of residential
properties under the VAT/GST all seem motivated
by this simple recognition.28 Currently, the most
explicit proposal of taxing resale, advanced by
Satya Poddar,29 is that although the standard VAT
rate is applied to the value of the resale, the seller
rates is considered independently of any change to the income
tax, it is obviously only the first set of effects that are relevant.
23Kaplow, ‘‘Capital Levies and Transition to a Consumption
Tax,’’ supra note 21. When VAT rates go down, the capital levy
is negative — there is a windfall to owners of existing business
assets.
24In efficiency terms, if the VAT (rate increase) is unantici-
pated, such value extraction from the private sector by the
government is efficient because tax revenue is collected from
assets that have already been produced. The tax does not distort
saving and production decisions. Conversely, if a VAT rate
increase is anticipated, people may be motivated to accelerate
consumption (to the extent they can) to avoid the capital levy.
The distributional effects of the capital levy resulting from the
introduction of the VAT depend on several general economic
factors, including whether a monetary policy is adopted to
allow a general price level adjustment and investors’ holding of
equity and nominally priced debt assets. Generally, one would
expect the price level to rise, which would help spread the
burden of the capital levy from equity holders to holders of debt
claims. See Bradford, supra note 20; and Kaplow, ‘‘Capital Levies
and Transition to a Consumption Tax,’’ supra note 21.
25Bradford, supra note 20, at 140; Kaplow, ‘‘Capital Levies
and Transition to a Consumption Tax,’’ supra note 21, n.29.
26Id. at 11.
27Interestingly, when Australia introduced its GST in 2000, it
allowed builders to elect the application of a ‘‘margin scheme’’
under which the value on July 1, 2000, the day of the GST’s
implementation, of properties forming the pre-GST inventory to
be deducted from subsequent sales price of such inventory
properties in determining the amount of GST due. Christine
Peacock, ‘‘Changes to the Australian GST Immovable Property
‘Margin Scheme,’’’ 17 Int’l VAT Monitor 328 (2006). However, it
would seem that this policy was not aimed at avoiding a capital
levy on existing asset. It is believed that because the buyer in a
transaction to which the margin scheme applies would not be
able to claim input credit, the margin scheme would be used
only for residential property. However, the capital levy resulting
from a transition to a consumption tax would afflict all business
assets. Rather, the Australian policy seems more likely aimed at
mitigating the pressure of price increase in the housing sector.
28Taxing resale may also be supported on the ground that it
would reduce distortions in choices of inputs (between those
subject to the VAT and those, like self-supplied services, that are
not) for any renovation of the property. Various countries,
including Australia, that do not generally tax the resale of
residential property have rules that treat sales after ‘‘substantial
renovations’’ as first sales, thus mitigating the distortions deal-
ing in those cases. However, these rules tend to apply only if the
seller is carrying on an enterprise, and not to substantial
renovations by owner-occupiers. I am grateful to Rebecca Millar
for this point.
29Poddar, supra note 4. Other versions of the proposal can be
found in Robert Conrad and Anca Grozav, ‘‘Real Property and
VAT,’’ in VAT in Africa, at 81-112 (2008); and Cnossen, supra note
1.
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can take a credit for any VAT paid on his earlier
purchase of the residence. Credit can also be taken
for any VAT paid when making improvements to
the property. However, the total credit cannot ex-
ceed the amount of VAT chargeable on the resale
price.30 For properties not subject to the VAT on
their initial sales,31 imposing the VAT on the values
of their secondary sales can be interpreted as pre-
collecting tax (for the first time) on their future
consumption value for the rest of their useful lives.
Alternatively (or additionally — it is unclear which
is intended),32 this measure may eliminate the
windfall that the seller of the previously untaxed
property is believed to enjoy.
For properties that have been subject to the VAT,
taxing resale (assuming the VAT rate has remained
constant) is equivalent to imposing the VAT rate on
any difference between the selling price and the
sum of the original purchase price and any cost of
improvement already subject to the VAT. The idea is
that this difference approximates the unanticipated
appreciation in consumption value of the residence,
and that failing to apply the VAT to it would result
in undertaxation. Correcting for undertaxation
seems to be desirable on both efficiency and distri-
butional grounds.
To the author’s knowledge, proposals for taxing
residential resale have been discussed largely
among VAT specialists. As a result, many of the
criticisms of those proposals are doctrinal. Some
VAT specialists have asserted that for a VAT to
apply, a person must be engaged in economic or
business activities, and sales of used residences by
their owner-occupiers do not constitute these activi-
ties.33 Although doctrinal VAT issues are important
to discuss, it is perhaps more crucial to ask whether
the policy justifications for proposals of taxing
residential resale are adequate. As already dis-
cussed, whether there are genuinely problematic
distributional consequences for not taxing resale is
open to debate. The next section of this article
argues that there is no justification in efficiency
terms for proposals to tax resale.
Taxing Resale: Creating vs. Removing Distortions
Consider the economic incidence of a pre-
collected consumption tax on housing. First, under
standard economic theory, the tax on the portion of
the property’s purchase price attributable to land
(and implicitly the location) is borne by the owner
of the land.34 It is only the remainder of the tax that
is (potentially) borne by capital, labor, and con-
sumers. In other words, a portion of the tax on the
consumer good — a residence — is entirely shifted
to the seller as the landowner. This suggests that
even under a uniform consumption tax, the pur-
chaser of housing bears less of the burden of the tax
than on many other goods and services.
This is arguably unremarkable in the context of
newly constructed housing, because the factors that
go into the production of consumer goods and
services may all have different price elasticities:
There may be other factors that are relatively inelas-
tic in supply, and land may be just an extreme
example. It may be held that a VAT applied at a
uniform rate to all consumption does not attempt to
be an optimal tax by taking factor elasticities into
account. Instead, it aims at achieving production
efficiency — that is, causing minimal distortions in
the choice of factor inputs.35 However, reflections
on incidence take on an unusual significance in the
context of a VAT imposed on housing resale. Con-
sider a resale in which the property had already
been subject to a VAT — that is, when the consump-
tion tax had already been collected on the antici-
pated consumption value of the property. The
purpose in subjecting the property to a VAT again is
mainly to capture any unexpected appreciation in
the (expected) consumption value of the property.
But that unexpected appreciation generally cannot
be explained by the properties viewed as physical
structures; the value of the physical structure
should generally go down. Any actual improve-
ments made to the physical structures should also
have been subject to the VAT and therefore would
not create a net tax liability on resale.36 Instead, the
most important reason for increases in housing
value is locational premium. But this premium is
30This ‘‘no refund’’ position is an aspect of Poddar’s proposal
that is not followed in Cnossen, supra note 1, or Conrad and
Grozav, supra note 29. The need to refund in the case of
devaluation is discussed below.
31In this article, initial sales may be understood to include the
initial use of self-constructed residences. Ideally, a VAT system
should have self-supply rules that ensure self-constructed prop-
erty is treated in the same way as property constructed and sold
to third parties.
32As discussed below, the same tax burden on resale cannot
both bear on infra-marginal rent and affect marginal price.
33Engagement in economic, business, or commercial activity
has been a legal requirement for the existence of a taxable
transaction or taxable person under the VAT/GST laws of many
countries. Michael Evans, ‘‘The Value Added Tax Treatment of
Real Property — An Antipodean Context,’’ in GST in Retrospect
and Prospect, at 255-257 (2007).
34This is because land is inelastically supplied. For a basic
discussion of tax incidence in a partial equilibrium context, see
for example, Harvey Rosen, Public Finance, ch. 12 (2005).
35Ebrill et al., supra note 5, at 15-7.
36As discussed in the introduction, exempting sales of resi-
dential property (whether new or used) still means that the cost
of producing, maintaining, or renovating this property has been
subject to the VAT; there is ‘‘input taxation.’’
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inherent in the land and is by definition a form of
infra-marginal return.37 Under standard economic
theory, a tax on such premium should be borne by
the person that benefits from it — the seller of
existing residential property — and is unlikely to be
shifted forward to the buyer.
A similar conclusion holds if one considers tax-
ing the resale of owner-occupied housing that pre-
existed introduction of the VAT. Existing housing
stock is inelastic in supply — except to the extent it
actually deteriorates and dwindles. One may reno-
vate existing property, and the degree of renovation
is elastic. However, renovation is not likely to
generate substantial net VAT liability when resale is
taxed (in the absence of increase in location-based
rent).38 If the inelastic supply of pre-VAT housing
formed its own market, the tax-inclusive price of
the property should be determined entirely by
consumer demand, and the burden of any net VAT
on the resale of the property should fall entirely on
the seller. Alternatively, when existing residences
sell in the same market as new housing, it is
reasonable to assume that the VAT-inclusive cost of
new housing is what sets the market price. As a
result, proponents of taxing resale suspect that
owners of previously untaxed housing could reap
windfall gains. If there are windfall gains, however,
instituting the tax on resale would not change that
tax-inclusive market price of housing but would
only eliminate the rent.
Another way of thinking about the effect of
taxing the resale of housing that existed before the
VAT is to consider deeming the housing to be
subject to a taxable sale, at market value, at the time
the VAT is introduced. Proponents of taxing resale
would be sympathetic to this option if it were
politically acceptable. The future consumption ben-
efits of existing housing would immediately be
subject to tax through pre-collection; no consump-
tion could escape taxation through the deferral of
resale. The only remaining justification for taxing
resale would be any unexpected appreciation that
might occur in the future. However, the efficiency of
a tax on a deemed sale of existing housing actually
would not depend on applying the same tax rate
here as is applied to other consumption activities.
Instead, the efficiency arises because the tax would
be a capital levy: It would be a lump sum tax on
production, investment, and consumption decisions
that have been made already. Except to the extent
that a capital levy may be anticipated and may
create expectations of repeated capital levies,39 the
tax would not create any behavioral distortions.
Therefore, it would be unnecessary, purely from an
efficiency perspective, to stick to the rule of uniform
consumption taxation here. One may determine the
rate at which the capital levy is imposed regardless
of the tax rate applicable to future consumption
activities.
It should be clear by this point that the tax on
resale, as it is applied to consumption value attrib-
utable to location-based premium and past produc-
tion decisions, cannot have any effect in enhancing
production efficiency in an economy. Extending the
pre-collection method to resale thus seems only
tenuously connected to the basic aims of consump-
tion taxation — namely, minimizing distortions in
production and in consumption (in the latter case,
both across different goods and services and across
time). In substance and not just in appearance, the
tax on resale has more affinity to a capital gains tax
(or, if it is designed to exempt the normal return on
investment, to a pure profit tax), despite protests to
the contrary by some proponents of taxing resale.40
As a result, it may be imposed at very different rates
from the regular consumption tax.
In addition to not being able to correct any
distortions in consumption choice, taxing resale
may create distortions. If the owner-occupier does
not sell a property that has appreciated unexpect-
edly, he could enjoy the increased consumption
value without taxation under the pre-collection
approach. This could be viewed as a consumption
tax subsidy, relative to the option of currently taxing
the property’s consumed value.41 The owner would
lose the subsidy by selling. As a result, a lock-in
effect can be expected if resale is taxed.42 The effect
of this is distinct from the lock-in effect associated
with the realization principle under the income tax
37The value of the premium cannot simply be produced, and
thus has no production cost.
38Further, many VAT systems already have rules for treating
‘‘substantial renovation’’ as though it is an initial sale.
39See generally Kaplow, ‘‘Capital Levies and Transition to a
Consumption Tax,’’ supra note 21.
40Compare Cnossen’s claim that the answer to the question
whether the VAT-like tax on resale ‘‘resembles a capital gains
tax . . . is an unqualified ‘no.’ Although the two taxes are im-
posed on the same base . . . the [VAT] is a tax on consumption,
whereas the capital gains tax is a tax on income.’’ Cnossen, supra
note 1, at 16. However, no argument is given for this assertion.
41However, it may not be a distortionary subsidy in the sense
of creating a tax inducement or bias toward the continued use of
the property as opposed to substituting for other, taxable goods
and services. If resale is not taxed, the property may be sold for
a price reflecting the VAT-inclusive price of comparable new
property. This allows the seller to use the proceeds to purchase
other taxable consumer goods and services equal in value to the
housing property sold.
42The lock-in effect of taxing resale is briefly noted in both
Cnossen, supra note 1, at 15, and Poddar, supra note 4 at 456,
n.38.
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— that is, instead of creating distortions in invest-
ment choices, the lock-in effect of taxing residential
resale maintains a price distortion between the
consumption value of a house and other consump-
tion alternatives. Moreover, none of the recent theo-
retical proposals for undoing the lock-in effect
without abandoning the realization principle under
the income tax seems to work for locked-in con-
sumption.43
This section has attempted to review the pro-
posal to tax residential resale in light of the charac-
terization of housing as purely a consumption asset.
There is obviously undertaxed consumption value
in preexisting housing that has been untouched by
the introduction of the VAT, and in housing that
experienced unexpected appreciation since its tax-
able first sale. The question is whether taxing resale
can reach this consumption value. It clearly cannot
do so before resale takes place. Our reflection has
shown further that on resale, taxation may be either
unnecessary or insufficient. It would be unneces-
sary when the sales price is already determined by
the tax-inclusive price of newly constructed hous-
ing: Here the buyers’ housing consumption choices
are not tax favored compared with other consump-
tion choices. And it would be insufficient if consum-
ers only had existing housing to choose from. The
incidence of the tax on resale is on the seller. In
addition, taxing resale may do harm from a con-
sumption tax theory perspective by creating a
lock-in effect for undertaxed housing. The only
justification for taxing resale, it seems, is eliminat-
ing the differential treatment between new and
existing residences when they sell in the same
market for the same market prices. Even if that is a
reasonable goal, it cannot be understood as a matter
of preserving the integrity of consumption taxation.
In the next section, we examine whether taxing
resale may have other defects, particularly in cases
when housing is an investment.
Indexing for Risk-Free Returns to Investment
The last section argued that taxing resale is in
itself insufficient for bringing into the consumption
tax base the consumption value associated with
unexpected appreciation in housing value and with
pre-VAT housing stock. This is because of the
special nature of appreciation (that is, all of it is
economic rent) and the special character of existing
housing (that is, it is inelastic in supply). Even
without these objections, current proposals for tax-
ing housing resale may be criticized for not accu-
rately tracking the value of untaxed imputed
consumption. For example, under these proposals,
a rise in the consumed value of the property (for
example, because of better transportation and other
amenities nearby) will not create an additional tax
liability, as long as there is no sale of the property.
When the property is sold, it is only the rise in its
future expected consumption value, not the in-
creased consumption value that has already tran-
spired, that would give rise to any tax liability.
Moreover, the difference between the resale value
and the original purchase price underestimates the
increase in value in future imputed consumption.44
Similar observations can be made about situations
in which the actual consumption value of a prop-
erty turns out to be lower than expected (for
example, because an expected amenity was not
built). These inaccuracies may be tolerated as doing
rough justice, if taxing resale served to preserve the
integrity of the consumption tax. But the last section
of this article suggests that taxing resale may be
missing the mark in a more fundamental sense.
This section examines a different type of meas-
urement problem, arising because many home buy-
ers treat their residences as both consumption and
investment assets because of the enduring nature of
real property and its (perceived) propensity for
43Traditionally, concerns with the distortions (as well as the
unfair advantages of deferral) caused by the realization prin-
ciple have led to proposals for its abandonment and the
adoption of mark-to-market or other similar methods of income
taxation. More recently, it has been suggested that adopting
retroactive taxation can alleviate problems associated with
taxing income only when realized. See Noel B. Cunningham,
‘‘Observations on Retrospective Taxation,’’ 53 Tax L. Rev. 489
(2000). Under retrospective taxation, investments are taxed on
their assumed gains on disposition and interest is charged on
any deferred tax payments. Proposals of retrospective taxation,
however, are largely framed in terms of the need of the income
tax only to reach the risk-free rate of return on investment
assets. (There is no need to deal with risk premiums because, at
least in the idealized settings dealt with in these proposals,
taxpayers can adjust their portfolios to neutralize the effect on
any taxation on risk taking. And economic profit is generally not
considered.) They do not deal with the need to tax consumption
and therefore not with the difference between taxing consump-
tion currently or on a pre-collection basis. It thus appears that
only a tax that accurately measures and taxes imputed con-
sumption currently (corresponding to the mark-to-market
method of income taxation for investment assets) may avoid the
lock-in effect created by the pre-collection method of taxing
imputed consumption. This, of course, amounts to abandoning
the pre-collection method.
44For example, if the value of a property at its initial sale is:
V0 = Σt=(0,b) ct/(1+r)t,
(where b denotes the last period of the property’s useful life),
and if its sales price at time a (<b) is:
Va = Σt=(a, b) c’t/(1+r)(t-a),
(where c’t denotes the new expected consumption value for each
period after a), then:
∆V = Va - V0 = Σt=(a, b) (c’t - ct)/(1+r)(t-a) - {Σt=(a, b)
ct[(1+r)
-a-1]/(1+r)(t-a)] + Σt=(0, a) [ct/(1+r)t]}
The second term on the right side of the last equation shows
the amount of undervaluation.
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appreciation. Colloquially, when one purchases a
house or apartment, one may consider both its
rental value and its resale value. Although a con-
sumption tax should subject to tax the consumption
value of the asset — in the form of either actual or
imputed rent — the treatment of any pure invest-
ment return generated by the asset has to be more
carefully considered.
If the arguments against taxing resale contained
in the last section of this article are persuasive, these
measurement problems are of only secondary inter-
est in evaluating proposals for taxing resale. None-
theless, examining them closely can help in two
ways. First, it clarifies certain debates among VAT
specialists, especially regarding whether the same
asset can simultaneously have investment and con-
sumption value. Second, it situates, within a larger
framework regarding the consumption tax treat-
ment of investments, the concern that housing
consumption is undertaxed if resale is not taxed.
Some deny that a residential property can have
an investment aspect beyond its consumable aspect.
It may be argued that assets are either purely
consumption assets or purely investment assets.
According to this view, if someone purchases an
apartment with the expectation that it will appreci-
ate in value, and the apartment does appreciate in
value, the person, whether she lives in the apart-
ment or leaves the apartment empty, should not
claim that she holds the apartment only as an
investment. She may not derive utility use from the
increased value of the apartment before she sells,
but that does not mean that the apartment, even
before the sale, is not already providing her with
increased consumption value. In other words, con-
sumption value does not equal subjective utility. It
seems to follow from this view that there is no
change in the price of a residence that should not be
reflected in the consumption tax base. Conversely, it
may be held that other assets are pure investment
assets. For example, if one purchases as an invest-
ment a barren and undeveloped piece of land that
could not be put to personal use, a consumption tax
should not burden the purchase of the land at all.
Instead, the owner should be allowed to immedi-
ately expense the purchase.45
Against this view, consider the following ex-
ample. An apartment is for sale, and for each of the
next five years, it is expected to generate zero net
income flow — the rental value it generates each
year is offset by expenses in the same amount. But
a potential buyer, A, believes that the asset may be
sold at the end of year 5 for $100x. Suppose A’s
discount rate is 5 percent (we will come back to how
to interpret this discount rate). She should be will-
ing to pay up to $78.35x for the apartment. Suppose
that is what A does and that she sells the apartment
for the correctly anticipated price of $100x at the
end of year 5.
To make our example more specific, suppose that
during the five years of ownership, expenses are
incurred for services like repair and maintenance
that are taxable under the VAT. Thus, if the property
were rented at market value and the landlord was
subjected to the VAT for rental receipts, she would
not experience any net VAT liability — the input tax
credit for repair and maintenance services entirely
offsets the output tax. If the property is owner
occupied, the landlord effectively would have
borne the VAT on her housing consumption for the
current period by paying tax on the input service
(and not being able to take a credit for the tax).
In this example, the question for the proposal to
tax resale is this: If the VAT is imposed not only on
the initial purchase price of $78.35 but also to the
resale, how much of the asset’s appreciation should
be subject to the VAT? If a goal of the consumption
tax is not to tax the return to investment, the
intuitive answer is none, because the appreciation
merely reflects the accrual of investment returns. If
the resale were to be subject to tax, appreciation
should be excluded from the tax base. One way of
doing this is to adjust the initial purchase price of
the apartment upward by the appropriate rate of
return, say 5 percent. The purchase price so ad-
justed would be $100x, and the imposition of the
VAT on the resale for $100x would generate zero tax
liability. There would be an amount subject to the
VAT on resale only if the resale price exceeded
$100x, the adjusted purchase price.
This example illustrates what should already be
clear to many, namely, that an asset can be held for
investment and for consumption. One can view
homeownership as an investment without denying
that the owner may derive consumption value from
it. In this respect, housing and other consumer
durables are unlike stock and bonds and other
financial claims. That is, even though consumer
durables are investments in the sense that they are
purchases made in expectation of future return,
their return consists (whether primarily or partially)
in consumption. Further, the example shows that
proposals to tax resale must be refined to address
the character of housing as investment. The adjust-
ment of the initial purchase price, for example,
would not be straightforward if the expected net
consumption value of the apartment between the
initial sale and the resale is not zero, which is
generally the case. If the present value of the first
five years’ net consumption benefits generated by
45Canada allows that treatment of individual ownership of
land, at the taxpayer’s election. Poddar, supra note 4, at 466.
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the apartment contributes a positive amount to the
initial purchase price, it would not make sense to
adjust that portion of the purchase price by a rate of
return when computing tax liability upon resale. If
one knew what that portion was, one would want
to subtract it from the initial taxable purchase price
of the asset when taxing resale in year 5, because
only then could the appreciation in the apartment’s
expected consumption value after year 5 be meas-
ured. That is, one would have to adjust the initial
purchase price both (i) downward for actual con-
sumption transpired and (ii) upward to exclude
investment returns from the consumption tax base.
To be consistent with consumption tax theory,
proposals of taxing residential resale should ex-
clude the time value return of investment from the
tax base. It should also avoid taxing risk taking and
nominal increases in asset value resulting from
inflation. It may, however, tax the part of invest-
ment return represented by economic rent, because
there is no objection to that from the perspective of
consumption tax theory. Nonetheless, it is not clear
that proponents of taxing resale are ready to make
the more plausible refinements. For example, Con-
rad and Grozav46 propose taxing resale with infla-
tion adjustments, but Poddar47 and Cnossen48 make
no mention of these adjustments. Just as signifi-
cantly, Cnossen49 suggests that the taxation of resale
should allow refunds of previously collected VAT if
the housing property loses value, thus effectively
requiring the government to share the risk of prop-
erty price fluctuation with homeowners. By con-
trast, Poddar does not contemplate compensating
homeowners for overcollected VAT due to devalu-
ation after initial sales.50
The relationship between proposals of taxing
resale and risk taking is noteworthy. Recent schol-
arship has tended to agree that the consumption
tax, just like an ideal income tax, generally does not
impose a burden on risk taking.51 For instance,
under a cash flow consumption tax, any amount
that is invested rather than consumed would be
excluded from the consumption tax base; the
amount excluded and the yield it generates would
be taxed only when withdrawn from investment for
consumption. In effect, the public becomes a part-
ner in the taxpayer’s investment activities. Accord-
ingly, the taxpayer may make appropriate portfolio
adjustments to achieve a risk exposure and ex-
pected returns similar to what he could obtain had
there been no tax (just as he may do so in response
to an ideal income tax).52 Similarly, under a VAT, at
least for business taxpayers, any investment outlays
are immediately deducted in the computation of
VAT liability. As a result, ‘‘the general public shares
in the investment and payoffs in proportion to the
tax rate[; in] making the investment, the taxable
firm considers its share.’’53 However, the pre-
collection method works differently. The invest-
ment is fully taxed upfront and there is generally no
subsequent taxation. What this implies in terms of
the tax burden on risk taking is less often dis-
cussed.54
In fact, the pre-collection method also avoids
taxing risky returns. If two assets, one safe and one
risky, sell for the same price, the risky asset should
generate higher expected returns. Conversely, if the
two assets generate the same expected returns, the
risky asset should be cheaper, because the greater
risk should be compensated by greater yield. How-
ever, when the VAT is pre-collected on the purchase
of a consumer durable — or, more generally, when
the consumption tax is prepaid on an amount that is
used for both investment and deferred consump-
tion — no distinction is made regarding whether
the investment is made in a safe or risky asset. The
government collects the same amount of tax on the
purchase of a safe asset as it would on the purchase
of a risky asset sold at the same price. This means
that the government is not really pre-collecting the
tax that would be due on the periodic returns
generated by the risky asset. Those returns, being
risky, would have generated on average higher total
tax payments, but the government undertakes no
similar risk in making a pre-collection; instead, it
collects a sum certain. Thus, the pre-collection
method avoids burdening risk taking by requiring
the taxpayer to remit only the certainty equivalent
of amount of the tax that could be expected to be
due on the consumer durable/investment asset.55
In this case, no adjustment of investment portfolios
is needed for investors to maintain their risk pro-
files.56
46Conrad and Grozav, supra note 29; see also Conrad, ‘‘Com-
mentary on Poddar,’’ 63 Tax L. Rev. 471 (2010).
47Poddar, supra note 4.
48Cnossen, supra note 1.
49Id.
50Poddar, supra note 4.
51See, e.g., David A. Weisbach, ‘‘The (Non)Taxation of Risk,’’
58 Tax L. Rev. 1 (2004); Bradford, supra note 20.
52Weisbach, supra note 51.
53Bradford, supra note 20, at 132.
54Bradford has pointed out that for imputed consumption
taking place in the ‘‘tax-exempt household,’’ ‘‘the general public
does not share in the investment or the return. The investment
decision is based on the full cost and the full return.’’ Id. The
next paragraph in the text further fleshes out this idea.
55The conversion to the certainty equivalent amount is at the
taxpayer’s own rate for discounting risk.
56I have not seen a full exposition of this difference of the
pre-collection method from the rest of the consumption tax
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Taxing resale, however, deviates from this logic
of the pre-collection method. Under Poddar’s pro-
posal, the government would be taxing any actual
return above the expected return of an asset but
would not be compensating for any actual loss if the
expected return is not achieved. This changes the
payoffs of taxpayers’ bets, and it affects choices
involving risk in a way that cannot be neutralized
through portfolio adjustments. One might be
tempted to rationalize that asymmetrical treatment
by claiming that for legislative and administrative
simplicity, the case of devaluation can be ignored
because it is unusual for residential real estate to
lose value. The persuasiveness of this claim has
been somewhat diminished in many housing mar-
kets since the global economic downturn in 2007.
Moreover, even if one were willing to accept this
claim, the adjustment of the original purchase price
when computing the tax liability on resale by the
risk-free rate of return and a risk premium is
necessary. (In the example given earlier of person A
selling an apartment after five years for a 5 percent
per-annum gain, the 5 percent discount rate for A is
more plausibly understood as a risk-adjusted dis-
count rate and not the risk-free rate.) This is because
the government previously had not paid this pre-
mium, and sharing risky rewards without paying a
premium would clearly burden risk taking, which
is inconsistent with the rest of the consumption tax
regime and the theoretical goals of consumption
taxation.
On the other hand, if, in accordance with Cnos-
sen’s proposal, the government were to recognize
losses realized on resale, it would then be taking on
some risks associated with the asset — a different
result than when the government merely collects a
sum certain on the initial sale. This does not mean
that the normal consumption tax treatment of risk is
restored (that is, taxpayers make portfolio adjust-
ments that neutralize any tax burden on risk tak-
ing). Instead, some of the distortions of realization-
based income taxation may also surface.57 For
instance, a homeowner may be able to hedge
against price fluctuation of his residence and obtain
a tax benefit from a VAT refund in the case of loss in
value to the residence if either the realization of
gain on the hedged position is deferred by the
owner or if the gain on the hedged position is
exempt from taxation under a VAT.58 Those arbi-
trage opportunities would create a bias in favor of
risk taking, which also deviates from the consump-
tion tax norm of neutrality with respect to risk
taking.
Overall, the divergence of the economic structure
of proposals of taxing residential resale from the
normal structure of the consumption-type VAT may
be summarized through the chart on the next page
(italicized results in the chart indicate incorrect
treatments in light of consumption tax norms). The
cells in the top row denote the types of value that
may be reflected in investment return: (i) risk-free
rate of return, (ii) risky return, (iii) inflationary
value, and (iv) economic rent. A consumption tax is
generally expected to exempt the first three types of
value but bear on the last. Under the normal
consumption-type VAT, all acts of consumption can
be classified as either (a) deriving from consumer
durables or (b) not deriving from consumer du-
rables. Consumption of type (b) is consumption
occurring in the same period as the purchase of the
consumed good or service, and the VAT, through
full expensing for business purchases and full taxa-
tion of output, achieves the right mix of tax burden
on the four types of investment return (row 2).
Consumption of type (a) occurs after the period in
which the related durable goods are purchased. The
pre-collection method achieves the right mix of tax
burden except that it leaves out rent arising after
initial purchase (row 3). This is not a surprising
result: It has long been recognized that prepayment
of consumption tax liability will likely leave eco-
nomic rent out of the tax base. Proponents of taxing
residential resale under a VAT are simply motivated
by a significant instance of this gap in the tax base.
Their proposed solution, however, calls for a
mechanism that would have to differ significantly
from both normal VAT applicable to businesses and
the pre-collection method on consumer durables.
The mechanism is neither prepaid nor postpaid, but
the combination of a prepaid approach (taxing
initial sales) and a realization-based approach for
making up for the defect of the prepaid approach.
The realization-based approach, however, means
that unrealized, imputed consumption may con-
tinue to be untaxed. In addition, it potentially
brings types of investment returns other than eco-
nomic rent into the consumption tax base, which it
needs to avoid doing in order to be consistent with
apparatus (that is, in a cash flow consumption tax or under the
typical VAT treatment of business taxpayers), despite the wide
agreement on the importance of pre-collection for real-world
consumption tax implementation.
57See Robert H. Scarborough, ‘‘Risk, Diversification, and the
Design of Loss Limitations Under a Realization-Based Income
Tax,’’ 48 Tax L. Rev. 677 (1993).
58For tax arbitrage opportunities arising under a VAT due to
the exemption of certain financial transactions, see Joseph
Bankman and Michael Schler, ‘‘Tax Planning Under the Flat
Tax/X-Tax,’’ Brookings Institution Conference on Taxing Capital
Income: Do We? Should We? Can We? (Can We Not?) 19 (Sept.
2005).
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consumption tax norms. But refining the taxation of
resale to exclude the risk-free return and inflation-
ary increase in value, and to maintain neutrality
with respect to risk taking, would involve complex
adjustments that proponents of taxing resale are not
committed to making. This is no doubt because,
traditionally, the superiority of the consumption tax
over the income tax has been understood as resting
substantially on its ability to avoid complexities
arising from inflation and from realization-based
taxation. Typical VAT mechanisms do not need to
deal with these issues or with the danger of taxing
risk-free return.
It is therefore not surprising that taxing resale
will appear alien to many VAT specialists, or that
numerous VAT doctrinal objections can be raised
against it.59 But the fundamental, conceptual chal-
lenge to proposals to tax residential resale comes
from an economic, as opposed to jurisprudential,
perspective.
Fully Taxing Imputed Consumption: Why?
It is useful to reexamine the basic intuition that
motivates proponents of taxing resale. Consumable
value can arise from labor and investment decisions
already made before the introduction of a VAT (or
of any consumption tax). This is illustrated by
preexisting housing stock. It may also arise from
economic rent, as illustrated by land premia. One
might think that all consumable value should be
included in the comprehensive consumption tax
base, no matter how it arises. This normative
thought is likely to be what motivates proposals for
subjecting housing resale to the VAT, but it is
important to reflect on its underlying justification.
The principle of applying a uniform tax rate to
the entire consumption tax base may generally be a
useful guide for avoiding tax-induced distortions in
consumption choices. It is a good rule of thumb for
choosing efficient tax policy. But in some cases —
for example, consumable value corresponding to
past work and investment decisions and to eco-
nomic rent that has accrued to the consumer — the
guide is not effective regarding the goal of effi-
ciency. At least in theory, taxing that value at a rate
of 0 percent, 100 percent, or anywhere in between,
would not create behavioral distortions, because the
realization of the value does not depend on the
taxpayer’s new decisions. From an efficiency per-
spective, the non-distortive nature of the tax favors
its maximal use. Revenue raised by the tax may
allow lower rates to be used for distortive taxes; it
follows that the theoretically optimal rate should be
100 percent. Certainly, from this theoretical perspec-
tive, simply taxing the initial sale of housing may
seem too concessive and complacent (even if nearly
always politically popular) in leaving out very large
amounts of economic rent.
Consumption tax design in general and VAT
design in particular are more typically viewed as
aiming at neutrality.60 They try to offer the least
distortive (and practically implementable) versions
of a tax that is nonetheless accepted to be distortive
59To many VAT practitioners, the method of taxing resale —
by giving a credit for VAT paid on the prior purchase — would
not feel like the VAT at all, despite the label of a ‘‘credit’’
mechanism. True input tax credit in a VAT is generally designed
to ensure that a producer does not bear any of the burden of the
VAT charged on inputs. Any deferral of the refund of any excess
input tax credit over VAT on output would defeat this purpose
by making the producer bear (a part of) the burden of the tax,
and an indefinite deferral of the refund of tax paid on the
purchase of an asset until its resale would be utterly erroneous.
Although the proposed method of taxing resale may also be
analogized to the ‘‘margin scheme’’ of taxing used goods
adopted in some countries, the analogy is incongruous because
the margin scheme is typically used when the prior acquisition
was not subject to the VAT (for example, because the acquisition
was made from a nonregistered taxpayer).
60Poddar, supra note 4, at 444, purports to discuss options for
VAT treatment of housing by focusing ‘‘exclusively on neutral-
ity considerations.’’
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in some basic fashion — that is, by affecting choices
between work and leisure — and not taxes that are
completely free of distortions. From this more fa-
miliar perspective, leaving out of the tax base
consumption value derived from economic rent and
past decisions is not objectionable in the sense of
leading to behavioral distortions in itself. Specifi-
cally, it would not create a bias toward the enjoy-
ment of that consumption value.
The normative case to include this value in the
consumption tax base is more likely to be based on
distributional concerns or the idea of the ability to
pay.61 Taxing all consumed value, whatever the
source, based on the ability to pay is a perfectly
coherent rationale in itself, but it must be noted that
the traditional concern with the nontaxation of
imputed income/consumption from housing is
generally understood to be with inefficiency arising
from behavioral distortions. Moreover, the question
raised by the last section is whether the goal of
comprehensive inclusion of consumable value is
achievable under a VAT without undermining the
neutrality of the VAT. Our analysis suggests that it
would be difficult for a realization-based VAT to
capture the economic rent accruing to housing
without causing all kinds of distortions. It seems
that only some type of current taxation of housing
consumption can avoid those distortions. But cur-
rent taxation of a durable good like housing would
amount to abandoning the pre-collection method
and indeed to abandoning the VAT in favor of some
form of personal consumption tax.
61This is essentially the conclusion reached by Millar, supra
note 4, although the arguments she gave are quite different from
what are offered in this article.
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